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RELEVANT FACTS
Although the Appellees (the "Hesses") argue that the Appellants (collectively
"Allen and Canberra") failed to marshal the evidence, the parties1 recitations of the
material facts are essentially consistent. The primary differences occur where the Hesses
engage in hyperbole, speculation, and/or distortion of the testimony (such as incorrect
quotations of testimony, or taking testimony out of context as more fully explained
below). The following factual issues illustrate the differences.
What the AGEC Report Actually Says
In an effort to show that Canberra and Allen had perfect knowledge and
forewarning of the settlement of their house, the Hesses compress time and misquote both
the testimony and the exhibits received at trial. For example, the Hesses frequently state
that the AGEC Report reflected the presence of "collapsible soils" (or, even worse, "toxic
soils") on Lot 41. See, e.g., Appellees' Brief at 6, 7, 8, 22-23. In fact, the AGEC Report
was prepared in 1997. Tr. 521-22. Since the AGEC Report preceded the preparation of
the subdivision plat map by several years, and the layout of the lots and streets was not
known at the time of the AGEC Report, Tr. 613-15, the AGEC Report could not, and did
not, make any references to specific lots upon which the test pits were dug. Hence,
statements by the Hesses to the effect that the AGEC Report reflected the presence of
collapsible soils on Lot 41 are simply not true. In retrospect, it is now known that test pit
12 was located in what is now the back yard of the Hessesf property, Tr. 188, but there
was no testimony establishing that Canberra and Allen knew at the time of the sale of Lot

1

41 (in 2004, seven years after the AGEC Report) that test pit 12 was on Lot 41. Tr. 52122.
The AGEC Report also does not expressly state that there were "collapsible soils"
found in test pit 12. There are only two portions of the report that reflect data or analysis
pertaining to test pit 12. Those portions consist of: (1) Figure 3, which sets forth the logs
of all twelve test pits (showing a cross-sectional representation of the soils encountered)
(Figure 4 provides the legend and notes for the test pit excavations), and (2) Figure 6,
which sets forth the results of a "consolidation test" on a soil sample taken from test pit
12. Ex. 2, at Figure 2, Figure 4, and Figure 6, R. 4680. So that the Court can appreciate
the highly technical nature of this data, Figures 3, 4 and 6 are reproduced in the
Addendum to this Reply Brief. Applying the legend (Figure 4) to the log of test pit 12, a
reader could derive that test pit 12 contained about one foot of topsoil, followed by eight
feet of "silty gravel," underlain by two feet of "lean clay and silt," followed by one foot
of "silty gravel," with four feet of "lean clay and silt" extending to the bottom of test pit
12. Neither of the references to test pit 12 states that the soil is "collapsible," much less
"toxic."
The Hesses also claim that the evidence established the presence of "serious soils
problem in the development generally ...," and that the report "detailed soil problems
throughout the development." Appellees' Brief at 8, 22. Neither the AGEC Report nor
any other evidence established that there were "serious soil problems in the development
generally." In fact, the report states:
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Most of the soils present within the study area consist of coarse granular
soils which are typically not moisture sensitive. However, there appears to
be localized areas of collapsible soils. We were not able to identify specific
areas of concern due to the erratic nature of the clay and silt soils at the site.
With the known erratic occurrence, we suggest that the owners be aware of
the potentially moisture sensitive soils in the area and that excavation
observations and drainage precautions contained in the geotechnical
recommendations of this report be carefully followed.
Ex. 2, at p. 10, R. 4680 (emphasis added).1
The Hesses' geotechnical expert witness, James Nordquist, testified, "There is
nothing [in the AGEC Report] that states that the area is unsuitable for development." Tr.
204. In fact, Mr. Nordquist testified that if the soils in test pit 12 made the property in the
area unsuitable for construction of a home, AGEC would have noted that fact in the
report. Id. The Hesses presented no evidence that there were other incidents of settlement
at any other house, garage, road, sidewalk or other improvement built within the
subdivision. In short, there was no basis in the evidence actually in the Record for the
Hesses1 assertions that there were serious problems in the subdivision generally, or even
that the results of test pit 12 specifically gave notice that the area was unsuitable for
development.
Allen's Knowledge of Toxic Soils on Lot 41.

1

This quotation also points out the proclivity of the Hesses1 brief to add inaccurate

and unsubstantiated commentary to the testimony. In the last sentence of this quote, the
Hesses inserted bracketed material, so that the sentence read, in pertinent part: "With the
known erratic occurrence [of bad soils at the site],..." Appellees1 Brief at 5. As is
apparent from the entire quotation, the bracketed insert should read [of clay and silt soils
at the site].
3

Similarly, the Hesses' argument that Allen knew of "toxic soils" on Lot 41 is not
supported by the record. As support for this contention, the Hesses1 repeatedly quoted
David Allen's testimony as supposedly establishing that he "read through that report [the
AGEC Report]. .." See, e.g., Appellees1 Brief at 6, 7, 8, 22-23. In fact, the testimony, in
context, was as follows:
Q.
(Mr. Baird:) Why didn't you read it [the AGEC Report] in
detail, Mr. Allen?
A.
(The Witness:)
It was similar to the others. None of the
other homes we had any soils problems with them. The conclusions page
[of the AGEC Report] was what I was very interested in. I'm not a
geological expert. I read through that report and it really doesn't have much
meaning or understanding for me.
Tr. 612.
In the same vein, the Hesses' brief asserts that although Mr. Tanner (the real estate
agent for Canberrra who had all of the actual discussions with Mr. Hess about the
purchase and who filled in all of the relevant documents for Mr. Allen to sign on behalf
of Canberra) initially testified that he did not understand the AGEC Report, he ultimately
"conceded that 'it's not all that complicated' and that he could 'follow those
[recommendations] ...', and that '[the recommendations in the AGEC Report are]
something that builders need to know about, I suppose.'" Appellees' Brief at 6. Placed in
context, however, Mr. Tanner's testimony spoke only to one specific recommendation of
the AGEC Report, that "down spouts and drains should discharge well beyond the limits
of any back fill." Tr. 98. Yet, the Hesses' cut, paste and insert job makes it sound like Mr.
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Tanner conceded that interpreting and understanding the entire AGEC Report, including
the recherche discussion of, was easy.
The Jury's Award of Economic Damages Exceeded the Competent Evidence.
At trial, the Hesses1 counsel argued to the jury that its award of economic damages
should be approximately $330,000, noting that that amount was appropriate because it
was less than the $536,750 limit established by the court's Instruction No. 18. R. 3749,
Tr. 718-20. In particular, counsel requested that the jury award the following specific
sums:
1. $865.40 paid to Earthtec for investigation. See also Tr. 314; Ex. 17, R.
4680.
2. $9,752.28 paid to Terracon Consultants, Inc. for a soils study on the house.
See also Tr. 330-31; Ex. 35, R. 4680.
3. $24,483.00 and $186,777.50, or a total of $211,260.50, paid to Atlas Piers.
See also Tr. 316; Ex. 20, R. 4680 (Atlas invoice dated July 25, 2005); Tr.
328-30; Ex. 22, and 23, R. 4680.
4. $ 108,179.12 as the cost of future repairs, in accordance with an estimate
provided by Zions Builders.
These sums totaled $330,057.30.
Disregarding this argument and the evidence, the jury, getting only one number
right, awarded $10,617.68 as the costs of investigation and discovery, R. 3749, Tr. 775;
$330,057.30 as the costs of repair already made, R. 3749, Tr. 775; and an additional
$206,692.70 as the costs of repairs to be made, R. 3749, Tr. 776, for a total of
$536,750.00. While the Hesses concede that the jury made an error of $10,617.68 (in
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post-trial proceedings, the District Court reduced the damages by that amount), they
argue that the rest of the damages were supported by the evidence.
The jury's award was not a "simple math error," as asserted in the Hesses1 brief
(see Appellees1 Brief, p. 4, fn. 3). Instead, it was the product of simply disregarding the
evidence and the jury instructions. The only element of the award that was supported by
the evidence was the cost of investigation and discovery, $10,617.68. The Hesses
claimed, and their evidence proved, the costs of repair already incurred were
$211,260.50, not the $330,057.30 awarded by the jury. Similarly, the Hesses claimed,
and their evidence proved, the future costs of repair were $108,179.12, not the
$206,692.70 awarded by the jury.
On appeal, the Hesses argue that the jury's award for past and future costs is
supported by the evidence. With respect to cost of repairs already incurred, the Hesses
argue that the jury's award is based upon the invoices from Atlas Piers, which total
$211,260.50, plus u an estimate for repairs to the home from Zionfs Builders for
$108,179.12." Appellees1 Brief at 45. Thus, the Hesses' argument is that an "estimate"
(apparently made by the jury based on absolutely no actual proof) of the cost of future
repairs is competent evidence of the cost of repairs already incurred.
Continuing this Alice in Wonderland approach to the evidence, the Hesses then
argue that the jury's award of costs of future repairs was appropriate, because that was
simply the difference between the amount already determined by the jury (for costs of
repair already incurred, which, as the Hesses concede, included the costs of repair yet to
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be incurred) and the stipulated fair market value of the house if all settlement-related
damages have been repaired (which the court instructed was the maximum amount that
could be awarded for economic damages). Appellees1 Brief at 45, fn. 39. As further
support, the Hesses argue that the jury could have reasonably come up with this amount
because the house "does not include sidewalks, landscaping or any structures not attached
to the home itself," and that if the Hesses want to build anything else, "they will be
required to pay significant amounts of money to install additional piers." Appellees' Brief
at 45. The Hesses do not cite to any evidence to support these assertions. There simply
was no evidence presented at trial that any sidewalks or landscaping would have to be
installed on piers, nor any evidence of the costs of such items. Additionally, the Hesses
suggest that maybe the house could continue to settle, and, while they assert there was
testimony to that effect, they do not cite where the record contains such testimony.
Appellees1 Brief at 46, fn. 39. In fact, the Hesses1 witnesses testified that the home was

2

The Hesses assert that their house "sunk nearly five inches, which is

approximately ten times the normal amount of settling for a new home." Appellees' Brief
at 22. The portion of the record cited as authority for this statement actually states that
there is an elevation differential of five inches between different portions of the garage
floor. When the Hesses' counsel tried to elicit the expert's opinion, "So it settled 5 inches
from there?", the witness stated, "Not necessarily because a garage floor slab typically
slopes toward the front of the garage." The cited portion of the transcript makes no
reference as to the "normal amount of settling for a new home." Tr. 180-81. While the
"normal amount" that a house may settle may be known to the Hesses' counsel, as a
result of his cottage-industry in suing developers for soil settlement, that fact is not
supported at Tr. 180-81.
7

stronger now than a home built without piers, Tr. 398, and would be "as good as new" on
those items that were repaired. Tr. 418.
In short, the jury's award of economic damages exceeded the amounts requested
by the Hesses, and the outer limits of the competent evidence, by over $215,000, or 65%,
which also illustrates that the verdict was the product of passion and prejudice.
ARGUMENT
I.

CANBERRA AND ALLEN HAVE PROPERLY MARSHALED THE

EVIDENCE.
The parties do not disagree as to the law applicable to the duty to marshal the
evidence when challenging a factual determination. As noted by the Hesses, the
obligation to marshal the evidence "is not intended to gratuitously oppress an appellant;
rather it exists to facilitate a structured, realistic, and skeptical appraisal of facts without
unduly compromising the adversarial process. At its core, the duty to marshal evidence
contemplates that an appellant present 'every scrap of competent evidence introduced at
trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists' and then 'ferret out a fatal
flaw in the evidence/ becoming a 'devil's advocate."' In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, ^f 64
(citations omitted). Marshaling the evidence does not require that an appellant distort or
misquote the exhibits or the testimony.
As illustrated by the foregoing discussion of the evidence and the facts, Canberra
and Allen have met their duty to marshal the evidence. On the factual issues specifically
challenged in the Hesses' brief, Canberra and Allen have presented the competent
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evidence actually introduced at trial, and have shown why it does not support the ultimate
determination made by the jury. With respect to the jury's award of economic damages,
the competent evidence (not to mention the Hesses' argument in closing) establishes that
the award could not have exceeded $330,057.30, which was the sum total of all the costs
incurred and to be incurred by the Hesses in remedying the settlement of their home. The
Hesses' argument on appeal is, in essence, that the jury's excessive award was justified
by speculation.
The Hesses also assert that Canberra and Allen failed to marshal the evidence with
respect to their knowledge of the contents of the AGEC Report. First, as set forth above,
the Hesses make claims for the AGEC Report (e.g., that it showed "bad soils" on Lot 41)
that are simply unsupported by the evidence, or any reasonable inference to be drawn
from the report. The conscientious refusal of Canberra and Allen to concede that the
AGEC Report states something that it simply does not state is not a failure to marshal.
Second, the Hesses' repeated statement that Allen "read through that report [the AGEC
Report]...," has been shown to be a misquotation. Finally, Canberra and Allen have
accurately and completely stated for the Court what the report actually states. The jury
could have concluded that Canberra and Allen read the report thoroughly; however, the
AGEC Report simply does not identify the presence of "bad" or "toxic" soils on Lot 41. 3
To reiterate, the Hesses' own witness stated that if the soils in test pit 12 made the
3 As argued below at Point III, the jury should not, however, have been permitted to
speculate about whether Canberra and/or Allen should have interpreted the AGEC Report
as informing the reasonable developer of soils problems on what later became Lot 41.
9

property in the area unsuitable for construction of a home in the area, AGEC would have
noted that fact in the report. Tr. 204.
Canberra and Allen have presented the material evidence and testimony, and have
presented the Court with an evaluation of the evidence that concedes the reasonable
inferences that could be drawn by the jury. What the Canberra and Allen have not done is
engage in speculation and distortion of the testimony and exhibits.4
II.

PROVING FRAUD REQUIRES ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE
The Hesses failed, as a matter of law to produce sufficient evidence to support a

claim for fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent nondisclosure because: 1) there is no
evidence in the record that Canberra or, even more so, Allen, personally, knew or should
have known that collapsible soils existed on the Hesses' lot; and 2) that Canberra or
Allen withheld such knowledge about the soils on the lot from the Hesses.
As far as Canberra and Allen can tell, this is the first soil settlement case in Utah
to make it through a trial and then an appeal on the record of that trial.5 Of the applicable

4 To ensure that the marshaling was complete, Allen and Canberra hired a seasoned
appellate lawyer to review the Record and the transcript to ensure that nothing was
omitted.
5 Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 562, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 2007), went to trial, but not on soil
settlement ("The Moores pursued three of their remaining claims at trial: ... fraudulent
nondisclosure regarding the footings and grading, and fraudulent nondisclosure regarding
the windows.").
10

precedents,6 each of the cases went up on appeal before trial. Therefore this case presents
the Court with its first opportunity to review the application of fraudulent nondisclosure
and fraudulent misrepresentation law, in action. It is unlikely that the Court envisioned
that such application would allow a developer to be held liable for two claims of fraud
with no showing of intent or actual knowledge.
Yazd held "that a developer-builder may owe his buyer a duty to disclose
information known to him about the composition or characteristics of any real property
when that information is material to the suitability of the property purchased by the
buyer." 143 P.3d 283, 285 (Utah 2006) (emphasis added). Canberra and Allen are not
builders. Moreover, the undisputed testimony at trial was that Canberra and Allen met the
duty this Court promulgated in Loveland v. Orem City, 146 P.2d 763, 769 (Utah 1987)
(emphasis added); namely that a "developer has a duty to exercise reasonable care to
insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type of ordinary,
average dwelling house."
6 Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp,, 143 P.3d 283, 285 (Utah 2006) ("the district court
granted Woodside's motion for summary judgment"); Mitchell v. Christensen, 31 P.3d
572, 573 (Utah 2001) ("upholding the trial court's dismissal of Mitchell's claim against
defendants"); Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235, 237 (Utah 2002) ("plaintiffs, ... appeal
from an order granting a motion for summary judgment to defendants"); Smith v.
Frandsen, 94 P.3d 919, 921 (Utah 2004) ("the trial court granted Mary Mel's motion for
summary judgment"); Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 764 (Utah 1987)
("plaintiffs seek reversal of three district court order granting defendants' motions for
summary judgment"); Fennell v. Green, 11 P.3d 339, 341 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) ("the trial
court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment").
11

The District Court erred by allowing the jury to infer from the AGEC Report,
alone, that Canberra and Allen "should have known," prior to the sale, of problematic
soils on what later was designed by a licensed civil engineer to become Lot 41. From this
evidence, the jury returned a verdict of fraudulent misrepresentation, without any
evidence that Canberra or, especially, Allen knowingly made a single false or misleading
statement. There was no evidence that Canberra or Allen made any misrepresentation to
Mr. Hess (or, especially Mrs. Hess). In fact, Mr. Hess testified that he never had any
communicatiou at all with Allen and did not even know that Allen was a principal at
Canberra until well after the litigation commenced.
There was no evidence that Mr. Hess was misled into believing that the soils were
good- in fact the Seller's Disclosure states that Canberra does not know if collapsible
soils exist. The Sellers Disclosure is the only evidence the Hesses produced relating to
what Canberra represented about the soils at the time of the sale. In yet another example
of how the Hesses conflate their case:
First, Canberra and Allen were sellers of real property. ... As
established in Mitchell and reiterated in Hermansen, as sellers
of real property, Canberra and Allen had a duty to disclose
the AGEC Report to the Hesses, which they failed to do.
A seller's duty of disclosure could not be clearer. ***
Therefore, Canberra and Allen - as sellers of real property owed a duty as a matter of law to disclose to the Hesses
material known defects that could not be discovered by a
reasonable inspection; they had a duty as a matter of law to
disclose the AGEC Report.

12

(Appellees' Brief at 18 (emphasis in original).)7 There are two problems with this
argument: 1) The Mitchell and Hermansen courts did not say that Canberra and Allen had
a duty to disclose the AGEC Report;8 and 2) the Hesses put on no evidence that Canberra

7 The Hesses yet again attempt to place Canberra and Allen in the same liability boat and
cite the Court to Addendum C, the Seller's Disclosures and Addendum D, the Warranty
Deed. Neither of these documents support that Allen, personally, was a "seller." Instead,
Allen signed both documents, prepared by Tanner, as the CEO of Canberra.
8 The Mitchell Court said that "what constitutes reasonable care in the discovery of
defects, [is] whether the defect would be apparent to ordinary prudent persons." Mitchell
v. Christensen, 31 P.3d 572, 575 (Utah 2001). The Court went on to say "although the
proper standard for the discovery of a defect is that of an ordinary prudent person, this
does not mean that inspection by an expert will never be required." Id. The Court
concluded "that the Christensens had a legal duty to disclose the leaks in the swimming
pool prior to the sale of their property to Mitchell, assuming it is determined on remand
that the Christensens knew of the existence of the leaks." Id. at 576 (emphasis added).
The Hermansen Court stated the Mitchell holding as: "sellers of real property owe a duty
to disclose material known defects that cannot be discovered by a reasonable inspection
by an ordinary prudent buyer." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235, 242 (Utah 2002)
(emphasis added). Here, Mr. Hess admitted that he did not hire any experts to do an
inspection on the property before his purchase, and this of course begs the question, that
went unanswered at trial, and has thus far gone unanswered in the appellate courts—was
that prudent? See Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 562, 574, fn. 13 ("we also note that the Yazd
decision did not address the possible relevance of not obtaining a home inspection or
obviousness of defects.") More importantly, and crucially, there was no evidence put on
that Canberra or Allen knew about the potential of the soils on the Hesses' lot to settle.
And, Mr. Hess also failed to obtain a soils test by a geological engineer, as "strongly
recommended" in the house construction plans. Tr. 451; Ex. 33, R. 4680; Tr. 500-01.
13

or Allen knew that the lot sold to the Hesses had any defects. Arguably, if the Hesses had
put on evidence that Canberra or Allen actually knew that Lot 41 actually had a soils
problem and actually failed to disclose that fact, liability might follow if the builder and
the relevant subcontractors had later performed their work flawlessly.
Tellingly, there was no evidence that anything was said or not said, or written or
not written, by Canberra or Allen that was relevant to Mark Hess' decision to enter into
the transaction. "Fraudulent concealment... requires the seller to have acted 'knowingly
or recklessly9."' Moore v. Smith at 574, fn. 12. The Hesses failed to put on any evidence
that Canberra or Allen 1) willfully failed to disclose any information that Canberra or
Allen had, and 2) that Canberra or Allen understood that the AGEC Report was material
to the suitability of Lot 41 for construction; therefore, the Hesses failed to prove that
Canberra or Allen had the requisite knowing or reckless state of mind to commit fraud.
Contrary to the case at bar, in Maack v. Resource Design & Const., Inc., 875 P.2d
570, 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (another case decided on summary judgment), where a
seller had actual doubts about the integrity of the stucco on the home and did not disclose
anything related to such doubts, the Court determined that the seller could not be held
liable, since the buyer did not hire any inspectors to conduct inspections. Likewise, a

9 "[Negligent misrepresentation 'carries a lesser mental state, requiring only that the
seller act carelessly or negligently.' Fraudulent concealment, on the other hand, requires
the seller to have acted 'knowingly or recklessly.'" Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 562, 574,
fn. 12 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). The Hesses did not plead
"negligent representation" against Canberra or Allen.
14

seller was held not liable in Fennell v. Green, 11 P.3d 339 (Utah Ct. App. 2003), where
the developers had two soils reports10 prepared, including one report that was specific to
the lot relating to the dispute, and both reports were on file with the City. After a home
was built there was a landslide that caused damage and the Court "determine[d] that
Fennelfs fraudulent nondisclosure claim fails because there were no facts presented to
show that Wall or Green knew of a possible landslide condition on lot 31." Id. at 343.
Here, Canberra did not have a soils report specific to Lot 41 (a lot that had, again, been
designed by a licensed professional engineer and approved by another engineer for
Lindon City) and there is no evidence that Canberra or Allen were aware of potential
soils problems, yet a jury held each liable on claims of fraud for such problems.
Comparing the outcomes of Maack and Fennell, to the case at bar, illustrates the
problems with the application of fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent
misrepresentation law in Utah - at least the law as interpreted by the Hesses.
In this case, the party that had a legal responsibility under Utah law to the Hesses
was their builder. "Where a developer [Canberra] conveys property to a residential
contractor [the builder that constructed the Hesses' home], the knowledge and expertise
of the builder [not Canberra or Allen], and the independent duties owed thereby, interrupt
10 In fact, there was a subdivision-wide soils report, prepared for the developers, and
thereafter a lot specific soils report was prepared, for the developers, which showed a
scarp existed on the lot. Fennell at 340. Here, the AGEC report was a subdivision wide
report prepared for Canberra before the subdivision was platted, and at no time did
Canberra have a report specific to Lot 41. The Hesses, of course, were repeatedly advised
to have their own such report, which they repeatedly failed to do.
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certain obligations running from the initial developer [Canberra] to subsequent
purchasers [the Hesses]." Smith v. Frandsen at 925. Here, the soils report was on file with
the City for the builder to review. The builder,1 x not Canberra (or Allen), had the duty to
determine design parameters to build an average ordinary home on the lot purchased by
the Hesses.
Although the Hesses claim that they know the law and can apply it better than the
Utah Court of Appeals, the Anderson Court correctly interpreted Smith when it found that

11 Appellees claim that the Appellants' block quote on p. 44 of its Brief relating to a
builders duty is "not found in Smith or any other Utah case." (Appellees' Brief at 34.)
Appellants apologize for citing only Smith instead of also recognizing that part of the
quote was from Jury Instruction Number 20. The first part of the block quote is, in fact,
from Smith: "[T]he duties owed by ... developers are not without limitation. Even where
a duty is found to exist, it does not continue indefinitely. Absent intentional fraud, it
continues only until the buyer has adequate time and opportunity, through occupation of
the land or otherwise, to discover the existence of the condition, to take effective
precautions against it by repair or other means." Smith ^fl7. The second portion was the
agreed upon jury instruction and that language was also taken from Smith, albeit from a
different paragraph of the opinion. "In particular, builder-contractors are expected to be
familiar with conditions in the subsurface of the ground." Smith at ^fl9. u[T]he court
relied on the knowledge and judgment of the builder in finding that the developer had
satisfied his duty and was not liable to homeowners. Likewise, our decision today
requires contractors to be accountable, either directly or through explicit warranties from
their predecessors in title, for the suitability of the land upon which they build." Smith at

1123.
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a developer who did not build the home, which settled, had its liability under Yazd
severed. Anderson v. Kriser, 2009 UT App 319 at f 6.
In Smith, this Court cited three cases where a developer was found liable. Id. at
f24. None of these three cases is similar to the case at bar. The first case cited is
Barnhouse v. City of Pinole, 133 Cal.App.3d 171 (1982). There, the developer was aware
that the land had "springs and slides on the proposed subdivision site." Id. at 177. The
developer did not advise prospective purchasers of "preexisting slides and springs." Id. at
178. Thereafter, a slide damaged the property and the developer misrepresented that he
had actually fixed the problem and did not inform the purchasers that damage could
happen again in the future. Id. at 179. Finally, the property owners had expert testimony
at trial supporting their theory that the developer's actions caused the damage. Id. at 189.
Unlike Barnhouse, Canberra and Allen 1) were not aware of any soils problems, 2) did
not attempt to fix such problem and then misrepresent that the problem would not occur
in the future, and 3) the Hesses did not provide expert testimony that Canberra's or
Allen's actions caused their damages.
The second case cited is Washington Rd. Developers, LLC v. Weeks, 249 Ga. App.
582, 549 S.E.2d 416 (2001), where the developer hired the builder and sold the
completed home to the buyer. Id. at 582. The Washington Rd. Court specifically
addressed the situation at bar, where the developer is not the builder, and stated that the
developer is not liable for problems relating to the duties of the builder. Id. at 585. The
third case cited is Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979). The
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Moxley holding is quite similar to the decision in Washington Rd., as the Court discusses
the duties of builders.
We can see no difference between a builder or contractor who
undertakes construction of a home and a builder-developer.
To the buyer of a home the same considerations are present,
no matter whether a builder constructs a residence on the land
of the owner or whether the builder constructs a habitation on
land he is developing and selling the residential structures as
part of a package including the land.
Id. at 735. It is undisputed that neither Canberra nor Allen was the builder of the Hesses
home and therefore this Court should adopt the Anderson decision, which correctly
applies applicable precedent, as the law.
III.

WHAT CANBERRA OR ALLEN "SHOULD HAVE KNOWN" ABOUT

COLLAPSIBLE SOILS ON LOT 41 REQUIRES EXPERT TESTIMONY
This Court determined in Smith, "like developers, the law imputes to builders and
contractors a high degree of specialized knowledge and expertise with regard to
residential construction." Id. at ^|18 (emphasis added). "Expert testimony is especially
considered unnecessary, although helpful, in cases involving trades or professions that do
not require a high degree of specialized knowledge ...." Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Products,
939 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Because the Smith Court found that being a
developer requires a high degree of skill, the standard of care and any alleged breach of
such standard, by Canberra, a developer (or Allen as the owner of a development
company) requires expert testimony, as discussed in Ortiz. The Hesses should have
named an expert to testify that a development company, and the owner of a development
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company, would have read the AGEC Report and, from it, should have known that it said
that there was the potential for soil settlement to occur on the Hesses' lot (even though
the lot was approved by a licensed professional engineer for Lindon City, who was in
possession of the AGEC Report but who made no such warning). Instead, the jury was
allowed to speculate that by reading a scientific report that Canberra and Allen knew
that the Hesses' lot had soils problems, and withheld such knowledge from the Hesses.
In a similar case, where settling damage occurred, the Supreme Court of Wyoming
held that a developer could not be held liable for the damage because the plaintiffs failed
to show that the developer breached the standard of care, because the lots that it sold
"were suitable for the construction of ordinary dwelling houses" and that the developer
"had no control over the type of house to be constructed on each lot." Reoh v. Suchor
Investments, Inc., 699 P.2d 284, 287 (Wyo. 1985). Likewise, here: 1) the Hesses' witness
testified that an ordinary average home could have been built on this lot, satisfying the
developers' duty created in Loveland; and 2) neither Canberra nor Allen had anything to
do with the actual building of the house.
This dispute is not analogous to Schreiter v. Wasatach Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570,
574 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), as the Hesses claim, because in that case there was no legal
12 The parties in a position to understand the potential for soils problems on the Hesses'
lot - AGEC, the preparer of the report; the civil engineer hired by Canberra to plat the
subdivision; the Lindon City engineer who recommended that the subdivision be
approved - are not parties to this suit. Instead, Canberra and Allen were held liable when
the jury was allowed to presume Canberra and Allen understood from the AGEC report
that the soils on the Hesses' lot were "toxic."
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authority that retirement home operators were in a field requiring a high degree of skill
"where the average person has little understanding of the duties owed." Here the Hesses
claim that "Canberra and Allen not only received the AGEC Report, but they also read it
and knew about the potential for soils problems in the development," (Appellees' Brief at
24), and the Hesses claim this should make Schreiter applicable.
Without any expert testimony about what a reasonable development company
(Canberra) or a reasonable owner of a development company (Allen) could reasonably
understand from the AGEC Report, the jury was allowed to speculate from the mere
existence of the report itself that Canberra and Allen "should have known" about the
settlement problems experienced by the Hesses. Expert testimony was needed so the jury
had parameters to make the determination that Canberra and Allen's actions toward the
Hesses breached their standard of care, Downing v. Hyland Pharmacy, 194 P.3d 944, 948
(Utah 2008), "in the locality." Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher & Assoc, 24 Utah 2d 172,
476 P.2d 610, 615 (Utah 1970).
IV.

THE DAMAGES AWARDED IN THIS CASE WERE EXCESSIVE
Although the standard for overturning a jury verdict is high, the appellate courts

job is to review the evidence and determine if evidence "was presented at trial upon
which a reasonable, fair jury" could make the decision that was made. Ortiz v. Geneva
Rock Products, Inc., 939 P.2d 1213, 1218 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Pursuant to Rule
59(a)(5), Utah R. Civ. P., the damages found by the jury in this case, both the economic
and the noneconomic damages, were "excessive," as the total damages returned,
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approximately $3.1 million, were nearly ten times the specific hard costs, of
approximately $330,000, presented to the jury.
As noted in the Facts above, the damages awarded for costs of investigation,
repairs to date, and future repairs, ignored the District Court's instructions and were
directly against the evidence. Since the costs of repairs, past and future, awarded by the
jury exceeded the evidence that the Hesses presented at trial, it is apparent that the
damages awarded were given under the "influence of passion or prejudice."
We do not doubt that when a verdict is so grossly disproportionate to any
amount of damages which could have been fairly awarded as to make
manifest that the verdict was so suffused with passion and prejudice that
the defendant could not have had a fair trial on the issues, the trial court
should grant a new trial. ***
Notwithstanding what was said therein, we regard the true role to be that
if the verdict is so excessive as to show that it must have been motivated
by prejudice or ill will toward the litigant, or that passion such as anger,
resentment, indignation or some kindred emotion has so overcome or
distorted the jury's reason that the verdict is vindictive, vengeful or
punitive, it should be unconditionally set aside.
M. Stamp v. Union Pac. R. Co., 5 Utah 2d397, 303 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1956)
(emphasis added), quoting Wheat v. Denver R. G. W. R. Co., 250 P.2d 932, 935
(Utah 1951).
In reviewing the award of noneconomic, or pain and suffering damages, this Court
should reverse a verdict where the amount is so excessive that it appears to have been the
product of "passion or prejudice." Duffy v. Union Pac. R. Co., 118 Utah 82, 89, 218 P.2d
1080, 1083 (Utah 1950). Canberra and Allen have properly marshaled and presented to
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this Court the claims and testimony of the Hesses that bear on their pain and suffering.
While monetizing those claims is admittedly an imprecise task, and within broad
parameters left to the discretion of the jury, Canberra and Allen are not reticent in
asserting that an award of $2,625 million substantially exceeds the limits of a reasonable
award, and thus appears to be the result of passion and prejudice, rather than a
consideration of the evidence.
A comparison of the instruction given to the jury on this issue (Inst. No. 17, R.
3742) to the evidence and the outcome demonstrates that the verdict was far beyond the
bounds of a reasonable award. Instruction No. 17 advised the jury that its award should
be "the amount of money that will fairly and adequately compensate the Hesses for losses
other than economic losses." The instruction outlines the following matters that the jury
could consider in determining the amount of the noneconomic losses:
1.

"The nature and extent of damages." To the extent this instruction

advises the jury to consider the amount of its award of economic damages, the jury's
blatant disregard of the evidence and the court's instruction on economic damages13
justifies a reversal of the noneconomic damages award. To the extent the instruction
directs the jury to consider the "nature and extent" of the Hesses' noneconomic damages,

13 Presumably, if economic damages are incorrectly awarded by a jury the noneconomic damages are likewise incorrect. "Economic damages ... are not restricted,
presumably because they are less likely to be exaggerated by a jury, and also because
they are "hard" amounts, subject to careful calculation." Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135,
138 (Utah 2004) (emphasis added).
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the evidence put on by the Hesses was nothing like that put on in Andreason v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 848 P.2d 171, 176, where the plaintiff "meticulously testified
from his personal written records of expenses." Here the only specifically identified
economic hard costs relating to the Hesses' pain and suffering claim are: the garage sale
of the air hockey table, the ping pong table, and video equipment; the sale of Mrs. Hess5
wedding ring; and, bottles of Pepto Bismol. Further, there was no evidence that the
Hesses experienced "large wages losses, considerable medical costs, permanent
disability, loss of bodily function, gross disfigurement...." Duffy at 90, 1084. This case
illustrates the problem with the blanket claim of "pain and suffering;" namely that a jury
can return an absurdly large verdict that has no connection to the injury itself and without
the legal parameters that are in place to protect a defendant against an unusually large
punitive damages14 verdict.
2.

"The Hesses' mental pain and suffering," "The extent to which the

Hesses have been prevented from pursuing their ordinary affairs/' and "The extent
to which the Hesses have been limited in the enjoyment of life." Substantially all of
the direct testimony from the Hesses on these considerations is found at two points in the
transcript, Ms. Hess' testimony at Tr. 559-62, and Mr. Hess' testimony at Tr. 334-35.

14 It bears repeating that the trial court did not allow the jury to consider punitive
damages, even though the only claims against Canberra and Allen were for fraud.
Somehow the District Court determined that even though Canberra and Allen were found
liable for intentional torts, there was no evidence of Canberra's and Allen's intent to
commit the intentional torts to support punitive damages.
23

The evidence establishes that the situation was traumatic and frightening to the Hesses, it
affected their family life and marriage, and occupied their lives; however, it was not so
traumatic and frightening that the Hesses left the house. In essence, the evidence was that
the situation was bad, but not so unbearable that the Hesses fled the home. Canberra and
Allen do not contend that the Hesses did not have pain and suffering, but instead that the
award is simply not commensurate with the evidence.
3.

"Whether the consequences of these injuries are likely to continue and

for how long." There was no testimony that once the home was repaired that the Hesses
were going to suffer "diminished enjoyment of life," Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill
Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Utah 1980). In fact, the testimony was that the
settlement issues had been repaired, and that only the cosmetic repairs to the house
remained to be completed.
Even though there is no set formula for determining pain and suffering damages,
the damages still must be proved with certainty and with a "preponderance of the
evidence and the amount of damages by approximations and projections that rise above
mere speculation." Richards v. Brown, 222 P.3d 69, 83 (Utah Ct. App. 2009), quoting
Andreason, 848 P.2d at 176. The Hesses give a nod to the speculative nature of their
damages in their Brief by mentioning that the jury probably determined that it was okay
to give them money to build "sidewalks, a swimming pool, a fence, a shed, a rock wall, a
patio." (Appellees' Brief at 45.) Due to the lack of evidence, and the apparent passion and
prejudice of the jury relating to the damages awarded, the Court should vacate the pain
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and suffering damages, or remand this matter for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
The verdict of the jury on the Hesses1 fraud claims cannot be sustained, as a matter
of law. Thus, the jury's verdict should be vacated, or at a minimum the Court should
remand this matter for a new trial. Finally, the damages awarded by the jury simply were
not supported by the evidence at trial and these should be vacated, or the Court should
remand this matter for further proceedings with the trial court.

y\$ day of May, 2010

DATED this ^

v

Dallis A. Nordstrom
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the

,2010, two true and

correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT were served by mail,
postage prepaid, upon the following:

Stephen Quesenberry
Charles L. Perschon
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ
4844 North 300 West, Suite 300
Provo, Utah 84604-5663
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ADDENDUM
Figures 3,4 and 6 of the AGEC Report.
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